(16)-(19)

(16) A few difficulties arise at this point. Suppose I say "God is just." (At this point only over-simple examples will do; consider them placeholders for that which is developed in the following.) What are the relevant precedents? If I cite "profane" precedents such as the concept's application to Civil Rights legislation, a shopkeeper's decision to balance profit with affordability, etc., then it would appear that the "justice" predicated of God is all-too-human--it would appear, that is, that God has been cut down to the size of our concepts. (Marion.)

(17) On the other hand, if the relevant precedents are drawn solely from the "sacred" sphere, and if these are sealed off, so to speak, from "profane" precedents, then one faces a different problem: now it is hard to see how one would count as understanding what "justice" means as applied to God, since the concept no longer bears any connection to our concepts. To say "God is just" would then be akin to mouthing words in a language we do not--and in principle cannot--understand.

(18) (Moreover, if we cannot set our theological claims in relation to non-theological claims--that is, if we cannot see such claims as carrying on a series of precedents that includes non-theological versions of the same--then it is not clear whether we know what we are saying. The fact that a sentence makes sense should not be confused with its being meaningful. Think here of contemporary theology's fondness for sacramental language.)

(19) In face of this dilemma, it is not clear whether faith-seeking-understanding is possible--whether, that is, one can understand the faith without turning it into something else.