(27) The model of normativity underlying the preceding account of meaning. Briefly stated: the life of faith should be understood as a series of doxastic, practical, and emotional commitments. These commitments aim--usually implicitly--to carry on and so contribute to the norm implicit in a series of precedents.
(28) (Not that everything one does should be construed as the undertaking of a commitment, of course; there are instances when one is precisely not committed to or by one's thought, behavior, or emotion. Moreover, some of one's commitments make no implicit claim to normativity.)
(29) One's doxastic, practical, and emotional commitments thus recognize the normativity of certain precedents and seek that same status for oneself. They are normative claims, in other words, to the effect (a) that one should be recognized as going on in the same way as these precedents--recognized, that is, as "one of us"--and (b) that others who go on in the same way as a series of precedents that now includes one's contribution should be recognized on that basis.
(30) The recognition of commitments and the recognition of recognizers: if a commitment is retrospectively recognizable as carrying on the normative trajectory implicit in a series of precedents, it contributes to that trajectory; a person whose commitments are regularly recognized as doing so should be recognized as a reliable contributor to the series--that is, as knowing how to carry it on; and a person who is recognized as a reliable recognizer of such contributions should be recognized as a recognizer.
Monday, March 29, 2010
Friday, March 26, 2010
(24)-(26)
(24) Even with this account of meaning on board, we still face the threat mentioned earlier, namely, that the effort to understand faith unwittingly turns it into something else. Supposing, that is, that we understand a faith-commitment in terms of a series of precedents, that this way of understanding the commitment need not be thought to cut faith down to size, etc., it still seems as if everything depends upon our efforts, that this is something we can do under our own steam, and that in attempting to understand a faith-commitment we thus put faith in ourselves.
(25) To address this concern, we need to explain how this sort of meaning-making could itself depend upon--and be the result of--God's grace. A crucial issue that brings us to theology proper. But not yet.
(26) (Theological principle: "God's grace" refers always & everywhere to a particular, free act of the triune God. To talk rightly about grace is thus to talk about God doing something as Father, Son, and Spirit.)
(25) To address this concern, we need to explain how this sort of meaning-making could itself depend upon--and be the result of--God's grace. A crucial issue that brings us to theology proper. But not yet.
(26) (Theological principle: "God's grace" refers always & everywhere to a particular, free act of the triune God. To talk rightly about grace is thus to talk about God doing something as Father, Son, and Spirit.)
(20)-(23)
(20) Here it is crucial that the meaning of a concept changes over time, since this entails that a concept's application to God need not be thought to cut God down to creaturely size. To apply the concept "justice" to God is indeed to claim that this application carries on the normative trajectory implicit in a series of "profane" precedents, yet the theological application can be seen as both fulfilling and judging those precedents: just as Jesus' humanity is the judgment and fulfilment of all other instantiations of humanity, so God's justice is the judgment and fulfillment of all other instances of justice.
(21) The specifically theological meaning of a concept is thus retrospectively recognizable as carrying on the normative trajectory implicit in its ordinary applications; its meaning as theologically applied is not prospectively determined by these precedents, however, which means, again, that God need not be thought to have been "cut down to size" by them.
(22) An analogy: "I never knew what love meant until I had children." That does not mean that "love" has taken on an altogether new meaning, but that all previous uses of the concept pale in comparison to this one.
(23) In most cases it suffices to cite only a few of the relevant precedents: once the connection between a candidate faith-commitment and a few precedents (say, one "profane" and one "sacred") has been exhibited, a competent reader should know how the rest of the series would be filled in. No need to be exhaustive, in other words.
(21) The specifically theological meaning of a concept is thus retrospectively recognizable as carrying on the normative trajectory implicit in its ordinary applications; its meaning as theologically applied is not prospectively determined by these precedents, however, which means, again, that God need not be thought to have been "cut down to size" by them.
(22) An analogy: "I never knew what love meant until I had children." That does not mean that "love" has taken on an altogether new meaning, but that all previous uses of the concept pale in comparison to this one.
(23) In most cases it suffices to cite only a few of the relevant precedents: once the connection between a candidate faith-commitment and a few precedents (say, one "profane" and one "sacred") has been exhibited, a competent reader should know how the rest of the series would be filled in. No need to be exhaustive, in other words.
Thursday, March 25, 2010
(16)-(19)
(16) A few difficulties arise at this point. Suppose I say "God is just." (At this point only over-simple examples will do; consider them placeholders for that which is developed in the following.) What are the relevant precedents? If I cite "profane" precedents such as the concept's application to Civil Rights legislation, a shopkeeper's decision to balance profit with affordability, etc., then it would appear that the "justice" predicated of God is all-too-human--it would appear, that is, that God has been cut down to the size of our concepts. (Marion.)
(17) On the other hand, if the relevant precedents are drawn solely from the "sacred" sphere, and if these are sealed off, so to speak, from "profane" precedents, then one faces a different problem: now it is hard to see how one would count as understanding what "justice" means as applied to God, since the concept no longer bears any connection to our concepts. To say "God is just" would then be akin to mouthing words in a language we do not--and in principle cannot--understand.
(18) (Moreover, if we cannot set our theological claims in relation to non-theological claims--that is, if we cannot see such claims as carrying on a series of precedents that includes non-theological versions of the same--then it is not clear whether we know what we are saying. The fact that a sentence makes sense should not be confused with its being meaningful. Think here of contemporary theology's fondness for sacramental language.)
(19) In face of this dilemma, it is not clear whether faith-seeking-understanding is possible--whether, that is, one can understand the faith without turning it into something else.
(17) On the other hand, if the relevant precedents are drawn solely from the "sacred" sphere, and if these are sealed off, so to speak, from "profane" precedents, then one faces a different problem: now it is hard to see how one would count as understanding what "justice" means as applied to God, since the concept no longer bears any connection to our concepts. To say "God is just" would then be akin to mouthing words in a language we do not--and in principle cannot--understand.
(18) (Moreover, if we cannot set our theological claims in relation to non-theological claims--that is, if we cannot see such claims as carrying on a series of precedents that includes non-theological versions of the same--then it is not clear whether we know what we are saying. The fact that a sentence makes sense should not be confused with its being meaningful. Think here of contemporary theology's fondness for sacramental language.)
(19) In face of this dilemma, it is not clear whether faith-seeking-understanding is possible--whether, that is, one can understand the faith without turning it into something else.
(11)-(15)
(11) The precedents one recognizes can themselves be correct or incorrect, of course; these recognitions, too, can be mapped onto a series of precedents. Transition from the recognition of precedents to the recognition of recognizers.
(12) If the meaning of a candidate commitment (in this instance, a concept-use) depends upon its standing at the end, so to speak, of a series of precedents, it follows that the candidate use aims to carry on that series and so serve as a precedent for still other uses. In using a concept one thus recognizes certain precedents, and one seeks this same precedential status for one's own use.
(13) One's use of a concept thus contributes to its meaning, from which it follows that its content is in some respect due to one. More generally, one's doxastic, practical, and emotional commitments contribute to the norm implicit in the intersubjective practices they seek to carry on, which means that these norms are recognizable as one's own.
(14) It likewise follows that to use a concept (contribute to the norm implicit in a practice) is to change its meaning, if ever so slightly: the meaning of a concept is a product of a normative trajectory implicit in precedent uses; every time a would-be use is recognized as carrying on that trajectory, it opens up still further possibilities of carrying it on.
(15) One of the aims of theology is thus to open up possibilities for novel expression. One makes explicit the content of one's commitments and tries to see the commitment as going on in the same way as certain precedents; to the extent that one is successful, one contributes something novel to the series of precedents, thereby enabling still other novelties. (The example of metaphor.)
(12) If the meaning of a candidate commitment (in this instance, a concept-use) depends upon its standing at the end, so to speak, of a series of precedents, it follows that the candidate use aims to carry on that series and so serve as a precedent for still other uses. In using a concept one thus recognizes certain precedents, and one seeks this same precedential status for one's own use.
(13) One's use of a concept thus contributes to its meaning, from which it follows that its content is in some respect due to one. More generally, one's doxastic, practical, and emotional commitments contribute to the norm implicit in the intersubjective practices they seek to carry on, which means that these norms are recognizable as one's own.
(14) It likewise follows that to use a concept (contribute to the norm implicit in a practice) is to change its meaning, if ever so slightly: the meaning of a concept is a product of a normative trajectory implicit in precedent uses; every time a would-be use is recognized as carrying on that trajectory, it opens up still further possibilities of carrying it on.
(15) One of the aims of theology is thus to open up possibilities for novel expression. One makes explicit the content of one's commitments and tries to see the commitment as going on in the same way as certain precedents; to the extent that one is successful, one contributes something novel to the series of precedents, thereby enabling still other novelties. (The example of metaphor.)
(8)-(10)
(8) On meaning: (a) To know what it means when a baseball umpire calls a "strike" is to know when the concept is properly applied (a ball flies over the plate at a certain height relative to the batter) and what follows from its application (if three strikes are called during one at-bat, the batter is out, etc.). For simplicity's sake, what follows from a concept-application can be understood in terms of how it changes the conditions in which still other concepts might be applied--that is, the latter condition can be understood in terms of the former. (b) One knows these things by seeing the candidate concept-use as carrying on the normative trajectory implicit in a series of precedent uses--in this case, precedent uses of the concept "strike"--where these uses have committed their user (i) to use them only in certain circumstances and (ii) to certain changes in their normative status (as entitled to do certain things, prohibited from doing others, and required to do still others).
(9) (In this context, "to know" is not to construed as a thinking-out-loud, as it were, as if one knows something just insofar as one has thought explicitly about it.)
(10) So then: to know the meaning of some commitment implicit in the life of faith is to map it onto a series of precedents. If one is doxastically committed to the claim that God is just, one understands the justice thus predicated of God in terms of precedent circumstances in which the concept has been applied and the normative consequences of those applications. Likewise, if one is practically committed to the offering of a particular prayer, or emotionally committed to reacting angrily to certain circumstances, one can understands this act or emotion in terms of its relation to a series of precedents.
(9) (In this context, "to know" is not to construed as a thinking-out-loud, as it were, as if one knows something just insofar as one has thought explicitly about it.)
(10) So then: to know the meaning of some commitment implicit in the life of faith is to map it onto a series of precedents. If one is doxastically committed to the claim that God is just, one understands the justice thus predicated of God in terms of precedent circumstances in which the concept has been applied and the normative consequences of those applications. Likewise, if one is practically committed to the offering of a particular prayer, or emotionally committed to reacting angrily to certain circumstances, one can understands this act or emotion in terms of its relation to a series of precedents.
Wednesday, March 24, 2010
(4)-(7)
(4) A picture emerges that looks something like this: "faith" is a set of commitments that have been given to one, and one then sets out to understand them--that is, to think about what they mean and the reasons one could give for them.
(5) On this picture, "faith" is concerned primarily with the propositionally contentful. This is justified if understood as making-explicit that which is implicit in the life of faith; the idea here would be to render the current state of one's faith judgeable, thereby to contribute to one's faithfulness. Inasmuch, then, as (a) the life of faith seeks ever-greater faithfulness, and (b) the making-explicit of that which is implicit in one's would-be faithfulness plays a part in this seeking, it follows (c) that faith-seeking-understanding arises from faith itself.
(6) There is still something misleading about this picture, however. It seems as if there are two separate moments--"faith" and "understanding"--and that the former necessarily precedes the latter. Contrary to this, note, first, that that which is implicit in the life of faith can be made explicit precisely by trying to understand it. (This happens in other ways, too, though--as when one's putative faithfulness collides with that of another whom one takes to be faithful.) Second, that which counts as "faith"--and that which counts as "understanding"--is ever-shifting, depending on where one directs one's attention. That which I am trying to understand today under the name of "faith" can tomorrow contribute to my understanding of something else.
(7) On this picture, the procedure goes roughly like this: (a) a commitment implicit in the life of faith "shows up," whether because I have set out to examine that life or because something goes wrong. (Heidegger: The hammer breaks.) That which is implicit is now a candidate for understanding, criticism, etc. (b) To understand the meaning of this commitment is to see it as carrying on the trajectory of a series of precedents, with particular respect to their inferential articulation (that is, their circumstances and consequences). More on this later. (c) To understand its rationality is to be able to reason one's way back to it--paradigmatically by exhibiting it as the conclusion of a sound argument.
(5) On this picture, "faith" is concerned primarily with the propositionally contentful. This is justified if understood as making-explicit that which is implicit in the life of faith; the idea here would be to render the current state of one's faith judgeable, thereby to contribute to one's faithfulness. Inasmuch, then, as (a) the life of faith seeks ever-greater faithfulness, and (b) the making-explicit of that which is implicit in one's would-be faithfulness plays a part in this seeking, it follows (c) that faith-seeking-understanding arises from faith itself.
(6) There is still something misleading about this picture, however. It seems as if there are two separate moments--"faith" and "understanding"--and that the former necessarily precedes the latter. Contrary to this, note, first, that that which is implicit in the life of faith can be made explicit precisely by trying to understand it. (This happens in other ways, too, though--as when one's putative faithfulness collides with that of another whom one takes to be faithful.) Second, that which counts as "faith"--and that which counts as "understanding"--is ever-shifting, depending on where one directs one's attention. That which I am trying to understand today under the name of "faith" can tomorrow contribute to my understanding of something else.
(7) On this picture, the procedure goes roughly like this: (a) a commitment implicit in the life of faith "shows up," whether because I have set out to examine that life or because something goes wrong. (Heidegger: The hammer breaks.) That which is implicit is now a candidate for understanding, criticism, etc. (b) To understand the meaning of this commitment is to see it as carrying on the trajectory of a series of precedents, with particular respect to their inferential articulation (that is, their circumstances and consequences). More on this later. (c) To understand its rationality is to be able to reason one's way back to it--paradigmatically by exhibiting it as the conclusion of a sound argument.
(1)-(3)
(1) Theology as faith seeking understanding. Against blind faith. Against trimming faith to fit within one's (pre-)understanding.
(2) What does this mean: "faith"? An initial ambiguity between (a) faithfulness (the life of faith, especially one's implicit and explicit doxastic, practical, and emotional commitments as these are intended to be Christ-following--"faith-commitments" for short), and (b) that which one believes on faith. The latter as included within the former.
(3) What does this mean: "understanding"? To understand is to know what something means and what would entitle one to believe it.
(2) What does this mean: "faith"? An initial ambiguity between (a) faithfulness (the life of faith, especially one's implicit and explicit doxastic, practical, and emotional commitments as these are intended to be Christ-following--"faith-commitments" for short), and (b) that which one believes on faith. The latter as included within the former.
(3) What does this mean: "understanding"? To understand is to know what something means and what would entitle one to believe it.
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